Complete Home & Office Legal Guide/Complete Home and Office Legal Guide (Chestnut) (1993).ISO/stat/ussct/amtrak.asc

Text File | 1993-08-01 | 45KB | 803 lines

/* The full text of the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Amtrak vs.
Boston & Maine Corp. This is a significant case on the deference
given to federal administrative agencies. */

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible, a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be
released,  as is being done in connection with this case, at  the
time  the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part  of
the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of
Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v.
Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION et al. v. BOSTON & MAINE
CORP. et al. certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the district of columbia circuit No. 90-1419.   Argued January
13, 1992-Decided March 25, 1992

The Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970 (RPSA) created petitioner
National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak), a private
corporation, to provide intercity and commuter rail passenger
service.  The Act permits Amtrak to enter into "trackage rights"
agreements to use  tracks owned and used by freight railroads, 45
U.S.C. 562(a); and  allows Amtrak to ask petitioner Interstate
Commerce Commission  (ICC) to condemn railroad property "required
for intercity rail passenger service" if Amtrak and the railroad
cannot agree upon sale  terms, 562(d).  For purposes of the ICC's
condemnation order,  Amtrak's "need for the property" "shall be
deemed to be established"  unless the conveyance will
significantly impair the railroad's ability  to carry out its
obligations as a common carrier and unless Amtrak's obligations
can adequately be met by the acquisition of alternative
property.  Ibid.  Amtrak had a trackage rights agreement with
respondent Boston and Maine Corporation (B&M) to operate its
"Montrealer" train between Washington, D. C., and Montreal.

Amtrak claims it was forced to discontinue this service because
of B&M's poor maintenance of its track segment.  Subsequently,
Amtrak  entered into an agreement with petitioner Central Vermont
Railroad (CV) which provided that, among other things, Amtrak
would acquire the B&M track and reconvey it to CV, and CV would
grant trackage  rights to Amtrak and usage rights to B&M.  When
B&M did not  accept Amtrak's purchase offer for the track, Amtrak
sought and  received an ICC order compelling conveyance for just
compensation.

The ICC found, among other things, that 562(d) created a
statutory presumption of Amtrak's need for the track, which B&M
failed to rebut.  The Court of Appeals remanded the case for
further proceedings, concluding that, because Amtrak did not
intend to retain the track, it needed only its use, not its
ownership.  While petitions for rehearing were pending, 562(d)
was amended to allow Amtrak to subsequently convey title to
acquired property to a third party if the ICC finds the
reconveyance furthers the RPSA's purposes.  Nonetheless, the
court denied rehearing, holding that the condemnation was not
valid because the property was not "required for intercity rail
passenger service." Held:

1. The ICC's decision was based on a reasonable interpretation
and application of 562(d).

(a) The ICC's interpretation of the word "required" is due
deference as a reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous term in
a statute that the ICC administers.  See, e. g., Chevron U. S. A.
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837.
The existence of alternative dictionary definitions for
"required" indicates that the statute is open to interpretation.
The ICC's interpretation  gives effect to 562(d)'s presumption of
need.  In contrast, the Court of Appeals' view that "required"
establishes a separate condition that Amtrak's condemnation
authority is limited to property that is indispensable to its
operations is in clear tension with the presumption.  In
addition, 562(d)'s amendment confirms the ICC's definition, while
the Court of Appeals' strict rule would make the amendment
superfluous by barring condemnation whenever Amtrak's
purpose is to reconvey property.

(b) The ICC was not required to make specific findings regarding
Amtrak's actual need for the condemnation because its oversight
responsibility is limited to ensuring that condemned property
will be used in Amtrak's rail operations.  The statute's
structure and its presumption of need create a strong inference
that it authorizes Amtrak to make a reasonable business judgment
that condemnation is advisable, unless the statutory presumption
is rebutted.

(c) B&M's several arguments against the ICC's interpretation are
rejected.  The eminent domain power has been given to the ICC,
not a private entity thus is not limited as suggested by cases
such as United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, 243, n.13.
Furthermore, this case turns on the need for deference to the
agency, not to Amtrak.  The ICC's interpretation of 562(d) also
did not violate the "public use" requirement of the Fifth
Amendment's Takings Clause, since the agency's determination that
the condemnation will serve a public purpose by facilitating
Amtrak's rail service was not irrational.  See, e. g., Hawaii
Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229,  240-241.  Moreover,
the agency did not err in concluding that the  statutory
prerequisite that the parties were "unable to agree upon terms
for the sale" mandated nothing more than a factual determination
that they would be unable to reach agreement through further
negotiations.  Nor did it make inadequate factual findings in
concluding that B&M had not rebutted the presumption of need.
The ICC was not unreasonable in considering the effect of
trackage rights and the just compensation award in assessing
whether the conveyance would significantly impair B&M's ability
to carry out its obligations,  or in interpreting the
availability-of-alternative-property provision as referring only
to whether Amtrak could provide service using an alternative
route, not whether a lesser interest in property would suffice to
meet Amtrak's needs.

2. The parties' challenges to the ICC's just compensation finding
as well as certain other issues should be resolved on remand.
286 U.S. App. D.C. 1, 911 F.2d 743, reversed and remanded.

Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
Rehnquist, C. J., and Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia, and Souter, JJ.,
joined. White, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Blackmun
and Thomas, JJ., joined.
-------------------------------

Nos. 90-1419 and 90-1769
--------

NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION,
et al., PETITIONERS 90-1419                     v.
BOSTON AND MAINE CORPORATION et al.

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMISSION AND
UNITED STATES, PETITIONERS 90-1769              v.
BOSTON AND MAINE CORPORATION et al.

on writs of certiorari to the united states court of
appeals for the district of columbia circuit
[March 25, 1992]

Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court.

The Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) issued an order, upon
the request of petitioner National Railroad Passenger
Corporation, requiring conveyance of 48.8 miles of railroad track
from respondent Boston and Maine Corporation (B&M) to the
Corporation.  In these consolidated cases we must decide whether
the ICC's decision was based on a reasonable interpretation and
application of 402(d) of the Rail Passenger Service Act, 45 U. S.
C. 562(d), the statute the Corporation invoked in the proceeding.
We hold the ICC's decision is authorized by the statute, and so
reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit, which set aside the agency's action.

                                I

The National Railroad Passenger Corporation, or Amtrak, is a
private, for-profit corporation created by Congress in the Rail
Passenger Service Act of 1970 (RPSA), Pub. L. 91-518, 84 Stat.
1328, 45 U. S. C. 501 e